Retired general and military historian speak out
Adam Desaulniers
This Remembrance Day will be observed by
Canadians deployed abroad in over a dozen countries – many in UN
contingents that wouldn’t fill a minivan. When it comes to tackling
modern conflicts like the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, and Afghanistan, has
the political expediency of Canada’s peacekeeping image left our
soldiers fighting – and losing – yesterday’s war?
“The politicians
who make these decisions – who decide for instance, ‘We’re going to
declare the [Afghan] war over in 2011, folks’ – do not usually get
challenged with the consequences,” observes military historian Desmond
Morton of McGill University. “These small [UN] operations that have two
guys or a sergeant and a corporal are cheap, and they can say ‘We were
involved in 93% of all UN operations.’ When they want two Canadian staff
officers to go to Goma or some such place, it seems like a small
commitment and a little bit of profile.”
But such peacekeeping
posturing excuses neglect on the ground. “Successive governments have
created this myth – of both political stripes,” maintains retired
Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, who detailed the aftermath in his recent
memoir Soldiers Made Me Look Good, “because you can slash and burn the
defence budget if the country is convinced that we’re just peacekeepers
and we only need pistols and blue berets. Nobody much complains...
Northern Uganda, the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, and it just went on and
on and on... the only way to save money was to cut
personnel.”
“Today the infantry is 2000 smaller than the Toronto
Police,” he laments. “As far as the army itself goes, it really has to
be rebuilt – it needs at least five years. I say it’s broken because
it’s turned itself inside out. The army commanders have a horrendous
challenge these days. There’s very high attrition. A lot of soldiers are
on their fourth tour, and when they come home they’re only with their
families for two weeks. You do that for five or six years, and your
spouse looks at you and says, ‘You’d better make up your
mind.’”
The theory that a peacekeeping nation does more with less
takes its toll on fighting cohesion too, according to MacKenzie: “It
used to be that soldiers slept, trained, and fought together for three
years. Now we have units we patch together from all over the country – a
lot of them are reservists. The troops call it ‘plug and play.’ And then
when we bring them back they disperse.”
At the same time, much of
the Forces’ infrastructure is getting outsourced. “A general told me
recently he was working on his business plan,” says Morton, recounting
cost-cutting efforts that required trainees to return to the mess hall
mid-day rather than cook in the field. “That’s what I mean about
privatization,” he says. “Generals who have to think about nickels. The
military have lost all their battles in Ottawa since the early
nineties.”
The Pearsonian myth has done worse than send
peacekeeping-equipped soldiers to do counterinsurgency work, insists
MacKenzie – it’s politicized the treatment of war dead as well. “In the
Balkans when we had 27 killed and over 100 seriously injured,
nobody but nobody except for the families in Canada knew about it. In
fact bodies were brought back in the hours of darkness as a matter of
policy, and sent to the home towns where they were buried with proper
dignity and military funerals. But it sure as hell wasn’t a media event,
because it was deemed – erroneously, what we were doing – as
peacekeeping. But it wasn’t – it was two factions fighting each other.
That was not deemed to be in Canada’s image, so there was a blackout as
far as media reporting, that went on for about two years.”
Warring
factions with no clear lines of authority are the players in many modern
conflicts, notes MacKenzie, not warring states capable of brokering a
truce. “Factions don’t have a flag in front of the UN, they don’t have a
delegation, and if you broker a deal with them, there’s a very good
chance that you’re not even going to be able to find them... Because
they’re factions. And as a result – I know people are critical of me for
saying it – but when we go into missions like this now, we have to be
strong enough to say to the factions: ‘Keep the peace or we’ll kill
you.’ That’s the only way to control these bullies and drunks and war
criminals. You can’t go in and negotiate, like you used to be able to do
with countries when they went to war. Not many countries are going to
war these days.”
A case in point being Kosovo, where both experts
agree Canada failed to act in its own interest. Says MacKenzie: “We got
sucked into protecting a state run by a terrorist organization... Now
it’s sort of a mini-state with, unfortunately, prostitution and the
slave trade and drugs and foreign troops as their source of income.”
Says Morton: “CNN wanted war – it wanted people to go to Kosovo for
various news-type reasons, and it presented Kosovo as a shocking case of
Serbian genocide on humble, beautiful and lovable Albanians. The media
went along with it.”
Where opinions diverge is on the lessons to
be applied to the situation in Darfur – MacKenzie favours another NATO
intervention, where Morton sees more of the same, merely “a crude
Sudanese attempt to put down a separatist insurrection” with bad actors
on all sides.
MacKenzie believes it’s possible and necessary to
secure the refugee camps. “We’re not going to put [soldiers] into Sudan
and fight the Sudanese army and occupy Khartoum,” he says. “The UN
decided to augment the African Union force that’s there, and that’s
where General Dallaire and I have a lot of significant debate, because
before he became a senator he was very much on the side of NATO forces
assisting [in Darfur] but then the Liberal Party changed its mind, and
decided that they’d only send some armored vehicles and a few staff
officers, and it was declared that that was enough. And I still very
much disagree with that.”
“The area’s so large and the force is so
small, they’re spread so thin that they’re vulnerable – a number of AU
troops were ambushed and killed just over a month ago. Aside from the
country and the challenge, it just can’t be handled by the AU troops
because they just don’t have the transportation or the communication or
the means to do detailed patrolling. So we’re supporting a UN resolution
and a UN mandate, but it’s frustrating in the extreme because it’s not
effective.”
Both veterans still see value in Canada’s wafer-thin
UN deployments. “It’s tokenism, but they’re valuable assets on the
ground,” MacKenzie asserts.
Morton agrees. “They do useful work.
They speak English or French – useful languages in much of Africa and
elsewhere – and Canadians have a good reputation for taking these jobs
seriously, and doing them pretty well. I encounter people even here at
McGill who’ve met Canadians in Africa and come to Canada because of it.”
And past glories continue to pay diplomatic dividends, with Canadians
still counted on to get the ball rolling: “There’s a feeling that if
Canada’s involved, we’ll involve others, we’ll pull the rest of the lot
in.”
But foreign policy under Stephen Harper could change all
that. “I don’t think he cares very much about Canada’s profile among the
right-thinking people of the world, to put it mildly.”
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